We present a method for digital image waterma rking based on the modification of certain subsets Qf the wavelet packet decomposition. These subsets are determined both from a secre t key and an image dependent procedure that chooses a best basis from an energy criterion. The mark is set by imposing a parity constraint at each level of the decomposition. We elaborate on the choice of some of the parameters of the model, showing how they can be tuned so as to obtain good resistance to attacks. Examples are displayed to assess the validity of our approach.
Introduction
Digital image watermarking has attracted a lot of inter est in recent years, due in particular to the development of Internet and the World Wide Web. The aim is to protect ownership by including in the image a copyright informa tion. This information, or mark, has to be set in such a way that it is invisible: indeed, it must not alter the viewing content and, in addition, it should not be easy to remove.
Furthermore. the mark must be resistant to attacks directed at erasing it. Such attacks are of two kinds. whether one uses cryptographic or image processing methods. We shall be concerned in this paper only with the second type of at tacks.
A number of methods have been proposed to insert ro bust and invisible watermarks. Some operate directly in pixel space [1] , other in a transform domain, such as Fourier (2) or DCT (3) . We propose here to study a wavelet packet based watermarking procedure. Working in the wavelet do main yields a number of advantages: First, it allows to con trol in a precise way the location both in space and scale of the mark. Second, wavelet coefficients give a structured way of representing the information: as is well known for instance from studies in image compression, in most cases, only a few coefficients are large, indicating where the in formation lies in a given image in terms of scale and space. This is useful both for invisibility and robustness concerns. 
Recalls on Wavelet Packets
Wavelet packet decomposition (WPD) is a generaliza tion of the dyadic wavelet transform (DWT) where the low pass parts are further analyzed. Figure 1 shows the decom position tree of an image: the coefficients of each packet are obtained by successive filtering and decimation along lines and columns. As is apparent from figure 1, this rep resentation is redundant, and it is possible to extract a ba sis by selecting coefficients in an appropriate way. Figure 2 shows three levels of decomposition of an image, along with one of the bases corresponding to a particular tiling of the space/frequency domain. Usually, one defines a "best ba sis" as a basis that optimizes a certain criterion. A popular choice is to minimize the entropy of the representation [4] . A word on notation: Cp,i,j denotes the packet at resolution p in the frequency region indexed by i, j. Individual val ues of the coefficients in this packet are denoted Cp,i,j(k), where k codes for the spatial translation.
3 Watermarking based on the parity of cer tain subsets associated to a best basis Our method consists in inserting a mark by modifying the best basis associated to an image so that it respects some parity constraints. More precisely, the mark will be a se quence of O-s and 1-s ; we first compute the best basis us ing an energy criterion detailed below (the classical entropy criterion is not fitted to our needs because it is not robust to compression). We then extract certain subsets from this image is modifi ed so that, at each level p of the decomposi tion, the number of packets in the best basis which are se lected by the secret key is odd or even accordin g to whether the pth element in the mark is 0 or 1. This procedure in serts in some sense a "virtual" mark, since it is set on the structure of the best basis. We now make the different steps precise (see figure 3 ).
,--, Figure 3 . Different steps in the watermarking process.
• step 1: Wavelet packet decomposition.
• step 2: Best basis selection.
Since the mark is set on the best basis, the basis should be both robust to attacks and contain enough vectors so that suffi ciently rich marks may be implemented. For instance, we do not wish to select only packets at the highest or lowest resolution levels because they would 414 not fulfi ll these constraints. The following criterion for best basis selection helps to attain our objectives. In short, we shall elect a packet to be in the basis B if it has sufficient ener gy and if its offsprings do not share this property. Formally: Cp,i,j E B iff Cp,i,j E :FA and Cp+1,2i,2j � :FA' where the set :F>. is defined in a recursive way:
The best basis is thus of maximal depth and contains only packets which have "sufficient" energy: a packet is in the best basis if it belongs to :FA but its offsprings do not. :F>. is the set of packets which have energy larger than A and such that their brothers, father and uncles also have energy larger than >.. The important question of the optimal choice of the threshold>. is addressed in the next section.
• step 3: Extraction of the sub-bases .
Let B be the set of all admissible bases corresponding to the image. We define an operator E :
• , Bm are disjoint subsets of B on which the mark will be implemented. SB is the secret key associated to the process and we have : S B c B.
Note that, of course, the extraction operator E should not easily be invertible.
To each sub-base Bi, we then associate a scalar ei : ei is 0 if the number of elements in Bi is even and is 1 otherwise (see figure 4) .
:, LJ Figure 4 . Encoding of the mark on a sub-base .
• step 4: Encoding of the mark.
v'
We first modify SB according to the watennark that identifi es the owner of the image. This is modeled by an operator:
where the set of watermarks W is simply {O,l}m. SB* is computed in the following way: Once S B* is completely defined, we modify the im age to get the corresponding best basis B*. To this end, the coefficients of the offsprings of the elements suppressed from S B are increased in absolute value so that the energy in their packet becomes larger than >..
This procedure is iterated for each subset starting from the lowest resolution (see figure 4) . Finally, to make the process more resistant to attacks, we slightly mod ify the whole image in the following way: we multiply those coeffi cients which are "close" to the thresthold by a value that move them away from the thresthold.
Finally, the decoding process simply follows the same steps For some applications, for instance photographic reproduc tion of artworks, it is quite natural to focus on a given type of images. In this paper, we will rather specify a set of pos sible attacks and keep all freedom on the kind of marked images.
We have chosen to use as a model for the set of all pos sible attacks the Stirmark software. which has served as a benchmark for testing the robustness of watermarks by var ious authors [5] . Our aim in this section is thus to try and set some of the parameters of our method so as to maxi mize its resistance to the attacks implemented in Stirmark.
More precisely, we will consider the choice of the energy threshold in the best basis selection. To simplify notation, we denote from now on Ci the energy of the packet at "loca While it is not possible to find such a >. in general, we may try to be as close as possible to this ideal case. In this view, a reasonable approach is to use an asymmetric proce dure and to look for two reals (A, A') so that the number of coefficients for which Ci -A and di -A' have opposite signs is minimum in some sense. Denoting e and g the maximum and minimum of the energy of all packets, we consider the following stochastic modeling of our problem.
For a fi xed image D, we consider the set C of all its wavelet packets energy coefficients Cj. The set 0 of ele mentary events is composed of "all identifi ed attacks", for instance all attacks implemented in Stirmark. Our probabil ity triplet is thus (0, B, P), where B is the natural algebra associated with 0 and P is the uniform probability. For each index i E I, the wavelet packet energy coefficient di is a random variable whose probability distribution Fi is de tennined by the result of the action of all possible attacks on the particular coefficient Ci.
We consider the following random function :
where sgn(x) = �,sgn(O) = 0, and ¢ is a Coo function that approximates �e sgn function , such as the arctangent (this will simplify the optimization step). We seek to max
where E denotes expectation and the bounds set on (A, N), are a weak version of the requirements described at the be ginning of this subsection, namely that enough coefficients should be eligible, but packets with too low energy should not be included. Such restrictions also allow our problem to be well posed. otherwise (A, A') = (0,0) and (A, A') = (00, (0) would be degenerate solutions independent of the input image. It is easy to check that:
iEi If the Fi are 02, so is B(>", >..' )1, and its maximum may be found by classical gradient descent once the Fi are known.
To learn the Fi-s, we adopted the following strategy: for each image in a learning set, we computed for each Ci the empirical distribution corresponding to all attacks. We checked that, for a given position i, the empirical distribu tions Ff were roughly similar for all images I. We then approximated the common Fi using a shifted Gamma dis tribution with density of the form: are free parameters to be estimated from empirical distribu tion. The choice of the Gamma distribution and the form of the shift were made on the basis of the observed empir ical distributions and on "semi-heuristic"considerations. In particular, if we assume that one can model the action of at tacks as the addition of Gaussian white noise to the wavelet coefficients, then the energies should be distributed as a chi square. which is a particular case of Gamma distribution. In additi on. the fact Gamma distributions are stable by linear combinations is also useful for our purpose. Figure 5 shows examples of empirical distributions of the wavelet packets energy which have been submitted to the 89 attacks imple mented in Stirmak. Figure 6 shows a fitted Gamma distribu tion using a maximum likelihood estimate of a, b, c. Once the parameters and thus the Fi are known, it is an easy task to compute (A, X) that maximize B(A, X). While the above modeling works fine for attacks such as compression or small angle rotations. other ones based on cropping or low-pass filtering are not well controlled by this approach. These attacks can however be taken care of efficiently through adequate restrictions on the secret key.
This will be presented elsewhere.
1 While there are a finite number of attacks in Stirmark, we may still assume that Pi has a density by considering that the various parameters (e,g. the compression rate in IPEG) can be tuned in a continuous way.
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Figure 6. Empirical distributions of the attacked wavelet packet energies and the fitted version.
Numerical Experiments
We show an experiment on a boat image of size 256 x 256 pixels coded on 8 bits. Figure 7 shows the original signal along with a marked image containing a 32 bits watermark with redundancy equal to 71 . The PSNR between the two images is 49,27 dB. Figure 8 shows the watermark detector response to 1000 randomly generated watermarks after an attack consisting of JPEG compression with 30 % quality. This and other experiments made on several images with various attacks show that our method is an efficient and ro bust watermarking technique. 
